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NOTE
RECOVERING LOST PROFITS: THE
RESURRECTION OF SUBSIDIARIES (IS
THERE LIFE ON MARS?)
BRYCE YOUNG*
I. INTRODUCTION
The business world is an incredibly complex and fast-changing envi-
ronment. In a capitalist system that thrives on competition, businesses are
constantly seeking any advantage over their competitors (e.g., in the prod-
ucts they manufacture, the marketing they employ, the quality of employees
they hire and train, etc.). The need for efficiency often dictates the internal
structuring of a company, as costs can be greatly allayed by a systematic
organization. This is true of all aspects of a company, ranging from its ini-
tial election to become a corporation to having a vertical versus horizontal
infrastructure to how it handles the intellectual property rights it manages.
The internal structuring of a company is vastly important to the company’s
viability and long-term success.
After making these initial decisions, many businesses have found they
cannot handle the manufacturing, marketing, distribution, and selling of
their products with their original structure. Some have decided to contract
out their products, choosing to share the burden of production with an
outside company. Others have opted to simply expand their companies’
abilities to handle the increased demand, including the establishment of
subsidiaries. Subsidiaries allow businesses to retain internal control of trade
secrets and other proprietary information while still realizing many benefits
* Bryce Young is an associate in the business and commercial litigation division of the
Minneapolis-based law firm of Leonard, Street & Deinard. Prior to private practice, Bryce served
as a law clerk for the Honorable Alan C. Page, Helen M. Meyer, and Christopher J. Dietzen of the
Minnesota Supreme Court. Bryce graduated summa cum laude from the University of St. Thomas
School of Law, where he served as the editor-in-chief of the University of St. Thomas Law Jour-
nal. He received his Bachelor of Arts, summa cum laude, with a major in Economics from the
University of St. Thomas. Most importantly, Bryce wishes to thank his gorgeous wife, Ruth Noel
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of an independent corporate identity.1 Companies with patents have also
taken advantage of these benefits by either assigning the entire patent to a
wholly-owned subsidiary or by dividing patent rights among its subsidiar-
ies. These structures allow a company to retain entire control of its patent
while still allowing multiple entities to utilize the patent (e.g., one subsidi-
ary will be in charge of distribution while another is in charge of
manufacturing).
Unfortunately for companies litigating patent infringement, the Federal
Circuit has been slow to allow parent companies and subsidiaries to recover
lost profits from infringement litigation. In several cases, the Federal Cir-
cuit has held that subsidiaries often do not have enough proprietary interest
in the patent to sue for lost profits, even when the patent-holding parent
company is joined in the lawsuit.2 A subsidiary was only allowed to join a
lawsuit when it was clearly shown that it had an exclusive license to utilize
a patent, which entailed a highly factual determination of the nature of its
proprietary interest in the patent.3 As a result, many companies have not
been able to recover lost profits from third parties who infringe on their
subsidiaries’ licenses and have been forced to resort to taking a royalty or
some other form of compensation.
A recent case, however, may have breathed new life into the future of
the wholly-owned subsidiary. In Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., the
court alluded to the possibility of a parent company being able to sue to
recover lost profits on behalf of a wholly-owned subsidiary without stand-
ing to join the suit on the theory that the wholly-owned subsidiary’s profits
would “flow inexorably up to the parent.”4 Since the plaintiff did not factu-
ally prove that the profits flowed to the parent company, the court was not
given a chance to rule expressly on that issue. The court’s language, how-
ever, invites the question of whether the Federal Circuit was potentially
allowing parent companies to realize the benefits of a subsidiary relation-
ship without risking the ability to recover lost profits in patent infringement
suits.
I will begin by discussing the potential benefits and advantages to di-
viding patent rights, specifically to subsidiaries, and why these advantages
have caused some companies to risk lost profits from patent infringement
litigation. Next, I will discuss the relevant case law on legal standing for
subsidiaries and the legal obstacles that have prevented the parent com-
pany’s recovery of lost profit damages. I will then discuss the possibility
1. Hubert Gatignon & Erin Anderson, The Multinational Corporation’s Degree of Control
over Foreign Subsidiaries: An Empirical Test of a Transaction Cost Explanation, 4 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 305, 305–07 (1988).
2. E.g., Morrow v. Microsoft Corp., 499 F.3d 1332, 1339–40 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Propat Int’l
Corp. v. RPost Inc., 473 F.3d 1187, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56
F.3d 1538, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
3. Morrow, 499 F.3d at 1339–40.
4. 527 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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that the Federal Circuit is finally allowing businesses that operate as a sin-
gle entity composed of several separate legal entities to recover for lost
profits. Lastly, I will discuss some of the unanswered questions raised by
the Federal Circuit’s recent jurisprudential shift. Hopefully, if this shift is
realized, businesses will be able to capture both the efficiencies and benefits
of various organizational forms while not losing the enforcement rights to
their patents.
II. REASONS FOR SUBSIDIARY BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
The face of business is constantly changing. One idea can transform a
business run out of a person’s garage into a 38,000-employee, multi-na-
tional corporation in a relatively short time.5 Other businesses may have a
less dramatic experience as they slowly and methodically expand their mar-
ket share and their companies’ size. However the expansion occurs, busi-
ness executives have much to consider when discussing how best to
accommodate the increased needs for research, production, marketing, and
distribution of their products and services. Much of the decision involves a
calculated determination of the desired level of control over the expansion
process, transaction costs of working with a new business, and the optimal
protection for intellectual property.6 These factors will determine the course
a business chooses from the plethora of available options (for example,
joint ventures, contracts with outside companies, subsidiaries) to pursue
when expanding.
Businesses have shown a growing trend to expand via establishing
subsidiary companies, either through buying already-existing companies or
establishing new businesses.7 A subsidiary company, by definition, is con-
trolled by another company, a parent company, which has controlling inter-
est in the subsidiary company. Accordingly, businesses are using subsidiary
companies as they used divisions and departments in previous eras. This
structure has netted greater efficiency for businesses and has become a lu-
crative option for expanding businesses. Consequently, the trend for subsid-
iaries is fairly easy to understand given the many advantages associated
with this type of organizational structure.
The primary benefit to having a subsidiary is the level of control re-
tained by the parent company. The parent company, as majority stock-
holder, can direct the subsidiary’s actions in every regard, subject to
5. See generally Our Story, MEDTRONIC, http://www.medtronic.com/about-medtronic/our-
story/index.htm (last updated Sept. 22, 2010). Earl Bakken founded a medical equipment repair
shop in his garage in 1949. A few years later, he created the first battery-powered pacemaker, and
his business exploded. His company, Medtronic, Inc., is now the leader in the pacemaker industry,
as well as being globally competitive in other medical devices, such as spinal fusion technology,
stints, insulin pumps, and neurological stimulators.
6. See Gatignon & Anderson, supra note 1, at 305.
7. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Megasubsidiaries: The Effect of Corporate Structure on Corpo-
rate Control, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1577, 1577 (1971).
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fiduciary duties owed to the subsidiary itself and third-parties.8 This close
relationship allows direct oversight of the subsidiary with minimal transac-
tion costs and guarantees that the interests of the parent company will al-
ways be respected and pursued by the subsidiary.9 Furthermore, the close
business relationship better safeguards proprietary information such as trade
secrets. This is especially true of wholly-owned subsidiaries, which are
completely owned and controlled by the parent company. The flow of infor-
mation between parent and subsidiary is, for all intents and purposes, inter-
nal company communication, minimizing the risk of exposure inherent in
providing proprietary trade secret information to outside companies.
The subsidiary approach also has several corporate income tax advan-
tages.10 Many companies with intellectual property assets set up intellectual
property holding companies (IPHCs), which are often wholly-owned sub-
sidiaries of the parent companies.11 These IPHCs then receive the intellec-
tual property rights from the parent company and license them back to the
parent for its own use.12 This structure allows a parent to set up an IPHC in
a jurisdiction with no income tax, so the “royalties received by the IPHC
are generally tax-free.”13 Plus, the parent can deduct the royalties it pays to
the IPHC as a business expense, reducing its overall income for taxation
purposes.14 Finally, the parent company can utilize any tax savings accrued
by way of creatively distributing profits and losses amongst the parent and
its subsidiaries.15
Beyond tax savings and management decisions, subsidiaries are often
used to shield the parent company from liability. In a products liability con-
text, a parent company will be held liable in tort litigation for its subsidi-
ary’s actions only when that parent has dominated the subsidiary’s
decisions and actions to such an extent that the subsidiary is a “mere agent”
or conduit “through which the parent conducts its business.”16 This protec-
tion also extends to discrimination claims and other claims against the sub-
sidiaries—all claims against the subsidiary are personal to that entity unless
8. Stefan J. Padfield, In Search of a Higher Standard: Rethinking Fiduciary Duties of Di-
rectors of Wholly-Owned Subsidiaries, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 79, 80–82, 115 (2004).
9. Gatignon & Anderson, supra note 1, at 305.
10. Lanning Bryer & Matthew Asbell, Combining Trademarks in a Jointly Owned IP Hold-
ing Company, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 834, 837, 860–61 (2008).
11. Id. at 837.
12. Id.
13. Kara K. Fairbairn, Intellectual Property Holding Companies Can Create Significant Tax
Savings and Protect Valuable Assets, FREDRIKSON & BYRON ARTICLES (Apr. 2003), http://www.
fredlaw.com/articles/ip/inte_0304_kks.html.
14. Id.
15. 18A AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 679 (2010).
16. 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 113 (2010). This principle follows very closely with
the test for the reverse piercing of the corporate shield for liability.
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a plaintiff can prove that the parent is truly manipulating the subsidiary
completely.17
Subsidiaries offer much of the protection of contracting with outside
companies without giving up vital control. Subsidiaries do come at a cost,
however, as establishing subsidiaries often involves huge asset expenditures
since the parent company has to purchase controlling shares of the subsidi-
ary’s stock.18 Furthermore, establishing and running a subsidiary often does
not capture the economies of learning that may exist with outside contrac-
tors who have specialized in the field.19 The business must decide if the loss
of liquidity is worth the advantages of establishing a subsidiary. Many large
companies have realized the benefits, especially the hefty tax advantages, of
establishing subsidiaries to handle the expansion of their companies.
Subsidiaries, however, have one specifically problematic disadvantage
when it comes to defending intellectual property rights—a seeming inabil-
ity to recover lost profits from an infringing party. In order for a subsidiary
to actually use a patented item without itself infringing on the patent, the
parent company, as the patent-holding entity, must grant some of the pat-
ent’s power and rights to the subsidiaries. In this effort, businesses have
divided their patent rights among the subsidiaries, allowing one subsidiary
to function in one way with the patent rights and another subsidiary to func-
tion in a different way with the patent rights. The practice of dividing patent
rights has created a barrier to recovering lost profits from a party infringing
on the patent—with the patent rights divided, courts have found that the
parent company and the subsidiary may lack standing to sue for lost profits
from the infringement because neither company owns enough of the patent
rights to have direct damages from the infringement. Accordingly, neither
the parent nor the subsidiary company can recover the full extent of the lost
profits. The next part of this article focuses on the development of this di-
lemma and the recent case law that may bring long-needed relief.
III. CASE LAW ON SUBSIDIARY PRUDENTIAL STANDING
Many businesses have adopted the parent/subsidiary organization for
their expansion process. This structure means many corporations actually
consist of a multitude of independent entities working together for their
common good. The modern corporation often has a primary headquarters
that oversees operations and logistics, while distribution, manufacturing,
marketing, and customer services are handled by different legal entities
under the supervision and direction of headquarters.
17. N. Stevenson Jennette III, Providing Safety Services to Subsidiaries: A Liability Trap for
Parent Corporations, 1990 DET. C.L. REV. 713, 713 (2009).
18. Gatignon & Anderson, supra note 1, at 305–07.
19. Id. at 307.
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Over the past two decades, many companies have tried to assert their
patent rights against infringers. These companies, unfortunately, have run
into significant legal resistance in recognizing the right of the subsidiary to
sue for lost profits. An analysis of the rationale denying relief provides per-
spective on the unpredictability businesses face when choosing to employ
subsidiaries and the need for change within the judicial system to allow the
company’s full recovery after infringement.
A. Overview of Standing
  The United States Constitution defines the parameters of the judiciary.
Under Article III, Section 2, courts shall have jurisdiction over “cases” and
“controversies.”20 In the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, this limitation has
meant that the courts can only hear cases involving, at the very least, an
alleged “personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlaw-
ful conduct” and that the injury will likely be “redressed by the requested
relief.”21 This subject matter is the purview of the judiciary. Constitutional
standing is relatively broad and often is not an issue in patent law cases.
Since patents are a statutory and not a constitutional right, however, the
courts must look to the statutes for authority.22
By creating enforceable patent property rights, Congress granted the
creator of a patentable invention the rights to exclude others from making,
using, selling, or offering to sell the patented invention in the United
States.23 To enforce this statutory right to exclude others, Congress author-
ized patentees, a group consisting of the original issuer as well as any suc-
cessors in title,24 to seek remedies for patent infringement in civil courts.25
Congress allows the patentee to be awarded “damages adequate to compen-
sate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for
the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and
costs as fixed by the court.”26 In order to seek money damages for patent
infringement, however, a party must show that it held legal title to the pat-
ent at the time of the infringement.27 Because 35 U.S.C. § 100(d) recog-
nizes successors in interest as patentees, an original patentee may assign
some or all of its proprietary interest to another and pass along the statutory
protection to that interest.28 If the party did not actually hold legal or propri-
etary interest in the patent, then the party did not suffer an injury in fact and
20. U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.
21. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
22. Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
23. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006); Arachnid, 939 F.2d at 1578.
24. 35 U.S.C. § 100(d) (2006).
25. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2006).
26. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
27. See Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Machine Works, 261 U.S. 24, 40–42 (1923).
28. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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does not have prudential standing to seek monetary damages for
infringement.29
The Supreme Court has a long-standing jurisprudence about the as-
signment of patent rights and what actions are necessary to convey a legal
title to the patent. A patentee may assign either “(1) the whole patent, com-
prising the exclusive right to make, use, and vend the invention throughout
the United States; or (2) an undivided part or share of that exclusive right;
or (3) the exclusive right under the patent within and throughout a specified
part of the United States.”30 However, only the entire transfer of a patent,
either for the entire United States or in a specific geographic part, grants the
new party enough of the legal title to sue for infringement of their own
accord.31 Assigning a part or a share of the exclusive right requires joining
the patent holder to the claim to satisfy standing requirements.32 This as-
signment creates an “exclusive license,” as the licensee has an express or
implied promise from the patent holder that others will be excluded from
practicing that right within that territory.33 An assignment that does not rise
to these levels is merely a license and does not grant the licensee a right to
sue for infringement, even when joined by the original patentee.34 Finally,
the court looks only to the legal effects of the conveyance’s provisions to
determine standing, not the title given to the entities by the parties in the
document.35 The next section will outline in greater detail the various rights
necessary for a conveyance to rise to the level of legal title to a patent.
The emerging issue in patent law has been the ability of a parent com-
pany, either with or through a subsidiary company, to sue for infringement
and to seek lost profits. The issue of standing is frequently implicated in the
transfer of the patent to the IPHC, or of the rights to the subsidiaries for
production or distribution, due to the lack of a conveyance of a legal inter-
est in the patent. In those situations, the parent company is often deemed to
still hold the equitable title to the patent; however, the parent company can
recover only its own damages, not that of the subsidiary.36 Since the parent
company did not create or sell the infringed product but only oversaw the
process, the parent company cannot claim lost profits directly. The parent
can only pursue a reasonable royalty of the value of the infringement—
which is often less than the lost profits from the subsidiaries and less than
the value gained by the infringing company.37
29. Morrow v. Microsoft Corp., 499 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
30. Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255 (1891).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Indep. Wireless Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 269 U.S. 459, 468–69 (1926).
34. Waterman, 138 U.S. at 255.
35. Id.
36. Morrow v. Microsoft Corp., 499 F.3d 1332, 1340–41 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
37. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
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B. Case Law on Subsidiary Standing—Exclusive Licenses
For a subsidiary to have standing to sue for lost profit damages, the
company must either have a proprietary interest in the patent itself or have
been granted an exclusive license from the patentee.38 If a patentee holds all
of the legal rights to a patent, it clearly has standing and can recover lost
profits.39 Cases where plaintiffs hold some, but not all, of the exclusionary
rights to a patent, however, are more difficult to determine; in these cases,
the court must determine if the plaintiff holds enough exclusionary powers
to warrant standing.40 In making this determination, the Federal Circuit em-
ploys a case-by-case, factually intensive inquiry to determine if a license
given to a subsidiary company is exclusive enough to grant standing to the
party.41 While there is much case law on this analysis, the court has never
established a clear, bright-line standard for exclusivity, as the analysis is too
case-specific to extrapolate general rules. Consequently, parent companies
can never truly be sure of their ability to recover lost profits through suits
brought by their subsidiaries—they can only interpret the case law and hope
their subsidiaries will be deemed to be more like an exclusive licensee than
not.
Over the years, the Federal Circuit has created a jurisprudence of fac-
tors that, at most, correlate with the determination of exclusivity for a li-
cense. Since the title of the license or the appearance of certain buzz words
are not dispositive, the court must determine the exclusivity of a license
from its very words as well as the actual manner in which it is imple-
mented.42 For this determination, the court often looks to the extent of the
rights retained by the patentee. The Federal Circuit found that an agency
relationship between the parent and the subsidiary makes the subsidiary re-
liant on the parent for direction with the patent and thus is not an exclusive
licensee.43 Furthermore, even when a parent needs to obtain the subsidi-
ary’s consent to grant another license, the Federal Circuit has ruled this is
not exclusive enough for standing, as the subsidiary does not have true veto
power and the parent actually still possesses the exclusionary power of the
38. Morrow, 499 F.3d at 1339–40.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1340.
41. See id.
42. See Intellectual Prop. Dev., Inc. v. TCI Cablevision of Cal., Inc., 248 F.3d 1333, 1344
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (“The title of the agreement at issue, which uses the term ‘license’ rather than the
term ‘assignment,’ is not determinative of the nature of the rights transferred under the agreement;
actual consideration of the rights transferred is the linchpin of such a determination.”); Ortho
Pharm. Corp. v. Genetics Inst., Inc., 52 F.3d 1026, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(“Thus, a licensee with proprietary rights in the patent is generally called an ‘exclusive’
licensee. But it is the licensee’s beneficial ownership of a right to prevent others from
making, using or selling the patented technology that provides that foundation for co-
plaintiff standing, not simply that the word ‘exclusive’ may or may not appear in the
license.”).
43. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1553–54 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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patent.44 The court has also ruled that a restraint on the subsidiary’s ability
to transfer its interest in a patent is a strong indicator of non-exclusivity and
lack of control over that interest.45 The fact that a company is, and may
have always been, the only licensee has been held to not be dispositive of
exclusivity.46 Even the transfer of the unilateral right to sue infringing par-
ties is merely an indicator of exclusivity.47
However, the Federal Circuit has ruled that a license can be exclusive
even though the parent company still retains (1) a reversionary interest in
the patent in the event of bankruptcy, (2) the ability to obtain patents in
other countries, (3) the ability to veto sublicenses, (4) the right to receive
infringement damages, and (5) the right to be informed of all lawsuits.48
Furthermore, multiple entities can be granted exclusive licenses, so long as
the licenses are restricted to separate geographical territories.49
This survey of the case law of the Federal Circuit only begins to reveal
the complexity of the balancing tests employed to determine exclusivity.
Many of these factors will weigh against each other with no clear hierarchy
emerging as to which is more persuasive. With so many factors in play, all
with countervailing merits on exclusivity, district courts seem to have wide
discretion in granting status as an exclusive licensee—one factor can easily
influence the equation and shift the balance. Under these conditions, busi-
nesses are gambling as to how much power they may retain in the parent
companies while maintaining an effective transfer of an exclusive license.
Businesses would like to be able to decrease the unpredictability of this risk
so they can better calculate their business allocations and operations. To
that end, businesses desire that their subsidiaries at least have a more calcu-
lated chance to be considered an exclusive licensee, especially given their
close relationship with the parent company.
C. Emerging Recognition of Close Business Relationships
The previous section’s discussion of case law and the quagmire of
rights necessary to trigger standing for a subsidiary appears daunting. Com-
panies are still employing this subsidiary approach to manage patents but
are losing millions of dollars in lost profits from infringements. The Federal
Circuit seems slow, if not openly resistant, to adapt its jurisprudence to the
reality that companies are becoming more complex and multi-faceted. The
current reality is that businesses exist as multiple, smaller subsidiaries act-
44. Propat Int’l Corp. v. RPost Inc., 473 F.3d 1187, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Morrow, 499 F.3d
at 1343.
45. Propat Int’l Corp., 473 F.3d at 1194; Morrow, 499 F.3d at 1342–43.
46. Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
47. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Propat Int’l
Corp., 473 F.3d at 1194.
48. Vaupel Textilmashinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia SPA, 944 F.2d 870, 875–76 (Fed.
Cir. 1991).
49. Weinar v. Rollform, Inc., 744 F.2d 797, 806–07 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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ing somewhat independently but overall for the betterment of the whole
umbrella corporation. The patent laws seem antiquated; assigning patent
rights to separate legal entities acting in specific capacities (such as produc-
tion, distribution, marketing, etc.) for the patent holder seems to be a forbid-
den, but extremely close, corollary to the permissive dividing of patent
rights between departmental lines within a single company. This distinction
prevents companies from fully recovering from infringement and may even
be allowing the infringing company to keep some of the benefit from its
infringing behavior.
A few cases, however, have recognized the tension between current
standing jurisprudence and emerging business trends. In Ricoh Co., Ltd. v.
Nashua Corp., the parent company, Ricoh Ltd., and its subsidiaries were
allowed standing to sue for lost profits from infringement.50 Ricoh Ltd. had
two subsidiaries, one acting as its distribution arm and one acting as its
manufacturing arm.51 Neither subsidiary was expressly granted an exclusive
license to manufacture or distribute.52 Rather than finding this was only a
non-exclusive license granted to a subsidiary, the district court took into
account the close business relationship between the subsidiaries and the
parent company to determine that there was clearly an implied exclusivity
in the license.53 While implied exclusive licenses were not entirely new, the
notion that the close business relationship between the two companies was
sufficient to imply exclusivity was a relatively new idea. In Ricoh, a court
finally realized the truth of these subsidiaries—modern companies establish
subsidiaries as a means of dividing their responsibilities and are unlikely to
compete against themselves by granting non-exclusive licenses to both their
own subsidiaries and their competitors. This precedent, unfortunately, was
not in the Federal Circuit and thus had very little traction in the legal
world.54
In Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Altair Eyewear, Inc., an unpublished 2008
opinion, the Federal Circuit also acknowledged that the close business rela-
tionship between subsidiaries and their parent organization could be
enough, given the correct context, to prove an implied exclusive license.55
In Aspex, the court upheld the district court’s refusal to grant summary
judgment denying standing to a subsidiary.56 The district court found that a
50. 947 F. Supp. 21 (D.N.H. 1996).
51. Id. at 24.
52. Id.
53. Id. (“Therefore, while REI is a separate and distinct corporate entity, it is not a mere
licensee; rather, it is a wholly-owned subsidiary that functions as plaintiff’s manufacturing arm.”).
54. The Federal Circuit has exclusive, nationwide jurisdiction over patent claims. While a
district court will be persuasive to others, only the precedent of the Federal Circuit and the United
States Supreme Court carries binding authority. About the Court, THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/court-jurisdiction.
html (last visited Apr. 25, 2011).
55. 288 F. App’x 697 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
56. Id. at 706.
30883-ust_8-2 Sheet No. 96 Side A      01/09/2012   11:19:24
30883-ust_8-2 Sheet No. 96 Side A      01/09/2012   11:19:24
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\8-2\UST207.txt unknown Seq: 11  4-JAN-12 9:36
2011] IS THERE LIFE ON MARS? 285
genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the subsidiary had an
implied or oral exclusive license due to the presence of a close business
relationship with the parent company.57 The Federal Circuit ruled that the
fact that both subsidiaries were “owned by members of the same family and
have a close business relationship”58 could be enough to show, in context,
that the parent company meant for the otherwise non-exclusive licenses to
be exclusive.59
While Aspex does not automatically grant subsidiaries standing with
the parent company, the Federal Circuit at least appears willing to recognize
an argument that the emerging business practice of using subsidiaries can
be meshed with the need to adhere to precedent on standing. The court may
have been trying to signal that it was establishing a narrow means by which
to recognize standing for subsidiaries that function as simple extensions of
the parent company, rather than denying them outright as it had done four
years earlier in Poly-America, L.P. v. GSE Technology, Inc.60 Aspex does
not clearly overrule Poly-America, but it seems to be placing an unprece-
dented amount of importance on a close business relationship, especially
when that relationship was given no credence four years earlier.61 Unfortu-
nately, both its procedural posture (the court was only ruling that a genuine
issue of material fact as to standing existed) and its demarcation as an un-
published opinion limit Aspex’s precedential value. Nevertheless, this could
be perceived as a step toward realizing the need for subsidiaries to recover
lost profits for infringement when they function as arms of the parent
companies.
This seeming shift in jurisprudence comes at a very interesting time.
As the next part examines, the Federal Circuit seems to have also opened
the door to allowing parents to prove that profits from their wholly-owned
subsidiaries would flow inexorably into the parent’s coffers. This possible
allowance makes sense as the next logical step in the progression toward
recognition of a subsidiary’s standing to sue for lost profits due to its close
business relationship with its parent company.
57. See id.
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. Poly-America, L.P. v. GSE Technology, Inc., 383 F.3d 1303, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(“Even though Poly-America and Poly-Flex seem to share interests as two entities col-
laborating in the manufacture and sale of textured landfill liners, that relationship by
itself is not sufficient to permit Poly-America to claim Poly-Flex’s lost profits from
Poly-Flex’s lost sales. Poly-America and Poly-Flex have a common parent corporation
and are not simply divisions of a single corporation, but are separate corporate entities.
Their parent has arranged their corporate identities and functions to suit its own goals
and purposes, but it must take the benefits with the burdens.”)
(emphasis added).
61. Aspex Eyewear, Inc., 288 F.3d at 706; Poly-America, 383 F.3d at 1311.
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IV. FOUNDATION FOR A POTENTIAL REVIVAL OF
WHOLLY-OWNED SUBSIDIARIES
As the previous part explored, the Federal Circuit has never expressly
ruled that it would allow a parent company to prove that a loss from a
subsidiary would be passed onto the parent, creating a de facto loss to the
parent company. The court has alluded, however, to the factual possibility
that a parent company may be able to prove and recover damages from lost
profits that would have gone directly from a subsidiary to the parent com-
pany. Because the court has yet to rule on this factual possibility, many
questions remain, including how direct the parent’s loss of profit must be or
if any evaluator besides cash (i.e., loss of tax deductions) would be allowed
as a compensable loss to the parent company. The court’s new language
represents a fairly significant departure from its original stance on the
standing of subsidiaries to sue for lost profits due to infringement. An ex-
amination of the line of cases leading up to this potential shift helps illus-
trate the rationale and progression of the jurisprudence governing a
subsidiary’s standing.
Ironically, the case that first hinted at the possibility of a factual find-
ing that the parent company suffered a direct loss from the subsidiary’s lost
profits was also the case that adamantly denied recovery based upon the
close business relationship.62 In Poly-America, the Federal Circuit admitted,
“recovery of lost profits by a patentee is not limited to the situation in
which the patentee is selling the patented device.”63 The court ruled that, in
order to claim lost profits, the “patentee needs to have been selling some
item, the profits of which have been lost due to infringing sales.”64 Since
Poly-America (the parent) was not selling “any item on which it” claimed
damages, Poly-America failed the first criteria and thus was barred from
claiming any lost profits.65 Furthermore, the court rejected the theory that a
subsidiary’s lost sales were legally compensable to the licensor.66 The
court, however, conceded that Poly-America might be able to recover dam-
ages if Poly-America could factually show it suffered lost profits from the
infringement.67 The court did not provide any guidance on how to prove
direct damages, but rather remanded the case for the district court to make a
factual determination on the issue.68 While the court’s language was
slightly encouraging, the clear rejection of a parent’s ability to claim a sub-
sidiary’s lost profits seemed to shut the door on any recovery short of the
subsidiary being granted an exclusive license.
62. Poly-America, 383 F.3d at 1311.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1312.
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In 2008, however, the court seemed to reopen the argument on the
parent’s ability to claim a subsidiary’s lost profits as its own. In Mars, Inc.
v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., the Federal Circuit was again confronted with a
parent corporation trying to recover lost profits through a wholly-owned
subsidiary.69 Mars argued that “by virtue of the parent-subsidiary relation-
ship and its consolidated financial statements, ‘all MEI’s lost profits were
inherently lost profits of Mars.’”70 The close business relationship consisted
of the subsidiary paying a royalty to the parent corporation based on gross
sales of machines using the patented technology.71 Mars’s theory was that,
had the infringement not occurred, the subsidiary’s profits would have
flowed directly to the parent corporation. The court, surprisingly, enter-
tained this legal theory, and upheld only the district court’s denial for lost
profits based on a factual determination that Mars did not show the subsidi-
ary’s profits would flow directly into the parent company. In fact, the
court’s language suggests that recovery on this theory may be permissible:
“we, like the Poly-America court, need not decide whether a parent com-
pany can recover on a lost profits theory when profits of a subsidiary actu-
ally do flow inexorably up to the parent.”72 The court simply held that the
“facts of [the] case cannot support recovery under a lost profits theory.”73
The court did say that, while determining lost profits is a very factually
specific determination, a parent’s mere ownership and control of a subsidi-
ary was not enough to show that the profits flowed inexorably to the parent
company.74
The Federal Circuit’s thorough analysis of Mars’s theory that a parent
may recover a subsidiary’s lost profits if those profits would have inexora-
bly gone to the parent seems to open the door to future claims of a direct
loss theory based upon a close business relationship.75 Furthermore, the
Federal Circuit’s inclusion of Poly-America in its statement accepting
Mars’s legal theory may even suggest a slight retreat from the hard-line
rejection of an almost identical legal theory in that case. Rather, the court
now seems willing, due to the emerging existence of subsidiaries and their
use of patents to help the parent company, to grant legal validity to argu-
ments that parent companies should be allowed to show a direct loss oc-
curred due to the close business relationship. This appears to be a
compromise between the need for a parent company to show a direct causa-
tion for damages through lost profits and the court’s realization that these
subsidiaries may exist to primarily function as a division within the parent
69. 527 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
70. Id. at 1367.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Robert A. Matthews, Jr., Legal Nuances when a Patent-Holding Company Seeks to
Enforce a U.S. Patent, 49 IDEA 549, 555 (2009).
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company. While not a retreat from the direct causation standard, this new
language may be granting companies a new avenue by which they can
prove the parent directly lost profits due to the infringement of its subsidi-
ary’s product.
Since Mars, at least one district court has recognized the possible shift
in the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence. The District of Hawaii interpreted the
Mars decision as affirming that “[a] parent company that holds an infringed
patent may only recover the lost profits of its subsidiary where it shows that
the profits of its subsidiary flow ‘inexorably’ to the parent.”76 The district
court ruled that, even though a sole proprietor owned both the parent and
the subsidiary and he could move the funds between the two as he saw fit,
there was no evidence that the profits would “inexorably” flow to the parent
company.77 The court was not willing to equate “inexorably” with possible,
or even “standard” or “usual” practices.78 Rather, the court needed express
“evidence of inexorability, either contractual, structural or historical,”
before it would allow the parent to claim lost profits from its subsidiary.79
In application, the new language from Mars appears to have been im-
plemented with some reservation, requiring a definite showing that the prof-
its would have gone to the parent company. However, the phrasing of
profits that “flow inexorably” up to the parent company need not be limited
to strictly wholly-owned subsidiaries.80 Rather, so long as the patentee can
show that the subsidiary company’s profits from the infringed patent would
have been transferred to the patentee’s company, courts may be willing to
grant lost profits due to the commercial relationship.81 The scope of Mars
will likely be limited, if not isolated, until the Federal Circuit directly de-
fines it. The expansion of the legal theory of causation, however, at least
breathes life back into a subsidiary’s ability, especially one with a close
relationship with its parent company, to recover lost profits, even without
being joined to the lawsuit. A parent company may now be able to recover
the lost profits of not just its subsidiaries, but possibly even unrelated com-
panies with which it maintains only a commercial relationship.82
76. Kowalski v. Mommy Gina Tuna Res., 574 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1163 (D. Haw. 2008).
77. Id. (discussing a possible hypothetical scenario where an “S” corporation may not dis-
tribute its profits to the parent company).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Matthews, supra note 75, at 556.
81. Id.
82. Id. (positing this as a possibility, but then admitting that “[w]hether practical realities of
the business world will permit a patentee to structure an arrangement with an unrelated nonexclu-
sive licensee—that has a measure of the licensee’s profits that flow inexorably to the patentee—
presents a question beyond the scope of this Article.”).
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V. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS FROM Mars
Like any emerging legal theory, this apparent shift in the Federal Cir-
cuit’s jurisprudence has left many questions unanswered about the actual
implementation of this new recovery theory. The Federal Circuit appears to
have opened the door for parent companies to theoretically prove their per-
sonal losses but left no guiding principles other than existing remedies law
to guide the lower courts. The real definition of this doctrine, at least until
the Federal Circuit decides to correct it, will be established in the factual
realm of the district courts. First, the courts will need to define the eviden-
tiary burden a parent company must meet to show the subsidiary’s profits
“flow inexorably” to the parent. Additionally, the benefits transferred from
a subsidiary to a parent company often entail more than mere cash flow.
The courts will likely have to determine if profit includes all benefits that
were denied to the parent company due to the infringement, or if it is lim-
ited to the percentage of profit that would have flowed to the parent com-
pany absent the infringement.
A. “Flow Inexorably”—A Problem of Definition
Up to this point, the Federal Circuit’s guidance has been limited; it has
simply stated that a parent company may recover when profits would “flow
inexorably” from the subsidiary to the parent.83 This language, although
seemingly instructive, does not define the necessary nexus between the two
companies’ profits. The district courts will have to set their own parameters
for the evidentiary burden of proving that the profit would move from the
subsidiary to the parent.
As discussed supra,84 a district court in Hawaii has already ruled that
there must be a guarantee that the profit will flow into the parent company’s
coffers.85 The court required contractual, structural, or historical evidence
that the profits would go to the parent company—mere possibility or even a
standard practice was not enough.86 Even this definition, however, seems to
allow for both explicit and implicit assurances that the profits will flow to
the parent. Explicit assurances are often easily understood and definable—if
a contract or agreement provides for the transfer, then the parent can re-
cover. Implicit assurances, however, likely require a heavy reliance on cir-
cumstantial evidence to prove the profits would have been transferred to the
parent company—in one case, even the presence of structural mechanisms
was insufficient.87
83. Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
84. See supra Part IV.A.
85. Kowalski v. Mommy Gina Tuna Res., 574 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1163 (D. Haw. 2008).
86. Id.
87. Id. (holding that a structure that allowed a sole proprietor to decide to not transfer profits
from a subsidiary to the parent was not sufficiently guaranteed).
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Historical evidence of past corporate practices seems to be prone to
more liberal interpretation. Acceptance of historical evidence of habitually
transferring the profits from subsidiary to parent seems to suggest that the
court is not requiring strict assurances that the transfer would have actually
occurred, but rather only a high likelihood of transference based upon previ-
ous conduct. Circumstantial evidence may be all that is required to prove
that the profits will “flow inexorably” to the parent company.
Kowalski is only one court’s interpretation. Other districts could easily
take a harder stance and require more direct proof. They could arguably
disallow any circumstantial evidence and only allow evidence that would
give strict assurance that the money was destined to go to the parent com-
pany. Both approaches would seem to be reasonable understandings of the
Federal Circuit’s intention but still present the same type of unpredictability
that was originally problematic in defining a subsidiary’s status as exclu-
sive. This will likely be an issue that the Federal Circuit will have to con-
sider and define in the next few years.
B. The Scope of Profit: Accounting Profit Versus Economic Profit
While many of the practical, purely logistical questions will be an-
swered by the district courts, a bigger question remains: What can be in-
cluded within the understanding of “lost profits”? Lost profits could be
limited to cash transfers or it could include other benefits that would have
been conferred upon the parent company had the subsidiary’s rights not
been infringed. Parent companies gain many advantages from their corpo-
rate setup and they are, theoretically and actually, directly damaged when
their subsidiaries lose profits. This economic benefit can come in the form
of a financial gain, but also in the form of a cost saved, such as having to
pay less on a loan to the subsidiary or decreasing the need to subsidize the
subsidiary’s actions. These benefits can also be impacted by infringements.
The civil remedy for patent infringement is meant to make the plaintiff
whole after the infringement. In fact, the statute provides that the goal is to
“award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringe-
ment.”88 The Mars court recognized the broad nature of the recovery stat-
ute.89 However, as the company only sought lost profits in monetary terms,
the court seems to have restricted its discussion to those terms.90 The ten-
sion between the goal of complete recovery and the traditionally limited
framework of lost profits prompts the discussion of expanding the defini-
tion of profits to alleviate that tension and to include restoration of all lost
benefits to the parent company.
88. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
89. Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
90. Id. (“Nevertheless, Mars expressly elected to pursue only lost profits and reasonable roy-
alty theories, and it stipulated that it would not seek ‘any other damages other than lost profits or a
reasonable royalty.’”).
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Economic profits capture the value from any deal, which can be more
than the profit line on an income statement. Economic profit is the differ-
ence between the benefits conferred minus the opportunity cost.91 The loss
in benefits would be considered the opportunity cost, as they should have
been realized by the best alternative—no infringement. The lost benefits are
the benefits that the subsidiaries would have conferred on the parent com-
pany in the form of some source of financial gain, whether it be royalties,
tax benefits, increased ability to cover the start-up cost of the subsidiary, or
greater financial independence from the parent company.92 These economic
rents may not be recognized in traditional accounting profits, but are still
benefits conferred on the parent company and would be captured with an
economic profit analysis.
This distinction between profits does not come into play if the parent
can prove that the financial gain from the subsidiary’s profits would have
flowed directly into the parent company.93 Depending on how strictly dis-
trict courts define “flow inexorably,” parent companies may struggle in es-
tablishing a direct linkage. At a minimum, a parent company may seek to
recover the cash that would have inexorably flowed into its coffers had the
subsidiary realized the lost profits. Unfortunately for the parent company,
this amount may be less than the actual damage, though it is better than just
receiving a royalty. The opportunity cost of the infringement to the parent
company is an actual, personal damage and should be compensable, espe-
cially considering the goal of the patent legislation to make the claimant
whole. The likelihood of the conferral of these economic rents on the parent
company would be easier to prove, as they could take many forms and
would likely be the very benefit sought when the parent chose a subsidiary
organizational structure.
The allowance for recovery of economic profits would seem to be a
neutral position between the goal of making the claimant whole again and
the need to restrict awards to direct damages. This recognition would also
increase predictability in companies’ awards for patent infringement suits—
they could be assured they would have the opportunity to capture the entire
value from their choice to utilize subsidiaries. The Mars court, however,
chose to limit its discussion to recovery for direct lost profits, which is a
traditional framework for recovering infringement damages.94 Furthermore,
due to the added difficulty of capturing the full value of a business arrange-
ment rather than simply the cash value of lost profits, courts may simply
91. See DOMINICK SALVATORE, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 339 (6th
ed. 2007).
92. See supra notes 5–19 and accompanying text in Part II for a discussion of these economic
benefits.
93. See St. Jude Med., Inc. v. Access Closure, Inc., No. 08-CV-4101, 2010 WL 4968147, slip
op. at *6 (W.D. Ark. Dec. 1, 2010).
94. Mars, Inc., 527 F.3d at 1366.
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avoid the problem entirely by requiring a clear, inevitable flow of cash from
the subsidiary to the parent in order for the parent to recover the subsidi-
ary’s lost profits.95 The fight between economic profits (and the loss of
benefits that would have been conferred directly upon the parent company
had there been no infringement) and mere accounting profits will likely
necessitate uniformity among the districts, requiring the Federal Circuit to
rule on this issue.
VI. CONCLUSION
Over the past century, intellectual property has emerged as a mainstay
for many businesses. Companies guard their proprietary trade secret infor-
mation with great fervor, often going to extreme measures to edge out their
competition. Within intellectual property, however, patent law has proven
to be an incredibly important facet of the business world.96 Patent law is
often the only way to ensure that a company’s product is protected from
being copied or infringed upon, stealing away coveted market share. In fact,
the fate of many companies lies most profoundly in their ability to retain
and enforce their patents. All product-oriented companies need to be able to
exclude others from using their products and be allowed an avenue to seek
redress from a company wrongfully using their patented technology.
Congress knew of this business need and enacted laws to grant specific
monopoly power to companies and equipped the law with the proper means
by which to seek remedies against infringing parties. Congress meant for
these laws to deter theft or infringement of business intellectual property, as
well as to make the infringed party whole again after the illegal act.97 The
law was apparently meant to be flexible to ensure full recovery and protec-
tion. Knowing that they could never write a law that would accommodate
all changes in the business world, Congress trusted the courts to interpret
the patent law in a manner that would be true to both the wording and the
intention behind the laws. The courts, while certainly not failing in this
regard, arguably may have fallen behind the realities of the business world.
Businesses are using subsidiary companies as they used divisions and
departments in previous eras. This structure allows the parent company to
outsource the duties to smaller entities within the company (as opposed to
keeping all aspects of every product within the same company) without
necessitating direct oversight from headquarters—allowing economies of
95. The practical limits of recovery due to problems showing direct causation and other fac-
tual evidentiary problems may also prompt the courts to follow an economic profit theory, but in
practice adopt a de facto accounting profit theory if they consistently rule that companies cannot
show the added benefits would have “flowed inexorably” to the parent company. Evidentiary
problems like that may make this distinction moot, but at least the acceptance of an economic
profit theory would allow companies the opportunity to attempt to prove and recover lost profits.
96. David A. Allgeyer, Protecting Your Company’s Most Important Assets, RISKVUE (Sept.
2002), http://www.riskvue.com/articles/rb/rf0209b.htm.
97. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2006); see 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
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learning and specialization to be more quickly achieved. Furthermore, this
structure provides tax gains as well as increased liability protection and
intellectual property security.98 This structure has netted greater efficiency
for businesses and has become a lucrative option for expanding businesses.
The courts, however, have been slow to recognize the close business
relationship and common purpose of some of these subsidiaries. They have
refused, or simply felt it beyond their authority, to amend their jurispru-
dence to acknowledge the changing business world. The Federal Circuit,
however, finally seems willing to recognize the emerging business model of
using subsidiaries. It allowed the close business relationship to imply an
exclusive license, allowing the subsidiary standing to join suit for lost prof-
its. More importantly, the Federal Circuit signaled that parent companies
may recover lost profits that would “inexorably flow” from the subsidiary
into the parent company.
The Mars decision marks a dramatic shift in jurisprudence and broad-
ening in scope of recovery that will likely have far-reaching implications.
Businesses may no longer need to live in fear that their subsidiaries will not
be able to join in lawsuits for lost profits due to an unpredictable, factually
intensive balancing test that places millions of dollars and companies’ en-
tire futures at the mercy of the district court’s factual findings. Rather, busi-
nesses can now try to grant their subsidiaries exclusive licenses, yet have
alternative theories for recovery if the court deems them to have failed to
convey legal title to the subsidiary—they can now sue for their subsidiaries’
lost profits in their own name if they can show the profit would have gone
to the parent companies. Businesses will be free to continue to reap the
benefits of their internal organizational structuring without having to worry
they will not be able to recover patent infringement awards.
Apart from recognizing the business world’s need for, and widespread
use of, subsidiaries, this shift in jurisprudence may also rectify the current
failure to account for all of the damages that are caused by an infringement.
In the current framework, neither the parent nor the subsidiary is made
whole after the infringement—they are not allowed full economic recovery.
This is in tension, if not contradiction, with the intent of Congress by creat-
ing civilly enforceable patent rights. Furthermore, the lack of recovery sug-
gests the infringing party is getting the better part of the bargain—it is
being allowed to disgorge (pay in damages) less than the benefit it received
from infringing. This result certainly does not discourage patent infringe-
ment, as businesses may start to realize they can make a profit by infring-
ing. The Mars precedent is likely an attempt to correct the unintended
consequence of incentivizing patent infringement (or, at the very least, re-
verse the decreasing deterrence to patent infringement) by providing com-
panies more theories on which they can recover their full loss.
98. See supra Part II.
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As monumental as this shift may have been, businesses still have rea-
son to be conservative when interpreting Mars. The Federal Circuit has
only begun to explain the scope and breadth of this new allowance for re-
covery. There are still many questions to be answered and it will take trial
and error coupled with strategic and creative legal thinking to test and chart
these unprecedented waters. While the future of patent awards may have
been dismal in the past for parent-subsidiary organizations, the Federal Cir-
cuit appears to be showing at least a glimmer of hope that a safe harbor of
recovery may actually exist within the close business relationship of these
organizations. So, while not totally revived, businesses can again be hopeful
that they will be able to have the best of both worlds—all the benefits of
subsidiaries plus the full protection of their patents. Consequently, there
may be life on Mars after all . . . for subsidiaries, at least.
